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All spending is not equal: European Union public spending, policy feedback
and citizens’ support for the EU
LISA M.DELLMUTH1 & ADAMW.CHALMERS2
1Department of Economic History, Stockholm University, Sweden; 2Department of European and
International Studies, King’s College London, United Kingdom
Abstract. While public support is central to the problem-solving capacity of the European Union, we know
little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens’ support through spending. Extensive research
finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the
EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however,
that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support
requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative
politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic
need in individuals’ immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human
capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period
2001–2011 corroborate this argument.As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly
publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through
spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.
Keywords: European Structural and Investment Funds; legitimacy; policy feedback; public spending; public
support
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is today more powerful than ever, addressing a broad array of
policy challenges ranging from poverty and unemployment to environmental degradation
and crisis management. This article seeks to enhance our understanding of a central
precondition for effective European policy making: public support for the EU. The support
of those who are governed by it enables the EU to gain governments’ support for ambitious
policy goals and achieve domestic compliance with international policy. In light of this, the
EU has an interest in alleviating its ‘democratic deficit’ since it undermines its capacity to
address problems effectively (Caldeira &Gibson 1995), just as any other political institution
depends on public support to solve problems (Weber 1978 [1922]; Suchman 1995; Dellmuth
& Tallberg 2015).Yet, despite growing interest among scholars (e.g.,Hooghe &Marks 2005;
Maier et al. 2012; Harteveld et al. 2013; Armingeon & Ceka 2014; Chalmers & Dellmuth
2015) and practitioners (e.g., Barca 2009; Van Rompuy 2012) in public support for the EU,
we know little about how far the EU can build public support in its institutions.
We offer a statistical analysis of how far the EU can influence public support for
European integration through public investment. When, how and why is the EU able to
shape public support for the EU through spending? The answer to these questions is critical
[Correction added on 27 September 2017 after original publication: The copyright line was updated.]
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to our understanding of the determinants of public support for the EU, the ability of the EU
to legitimise itself through public policies and the controversy about fiscal redistribution
through the EU budget now taking place.
We make two principal contributions to the study of public opinion towards the EU
and other regional and international organisations. First, we develop an argument about
the effects of the fit between supranational spending priorities and regional economic
circumstances on public support for the EU. The argument is in two parts. To begin with,
spending that accommodates regional economic needs, whether they be related to public
services, infrastructure, human capital endowment or the labour market, can positively
shape how individuals in that region think about spending and, in turn, the EU. The
better the fit between spending and economic need, the greater we expect the concerned
individuals’ support for the EU to be. This line of reasoning is underpinned by broader
insights related to policy feedback mechanisms in comparative politics and the economic
impact of European integration (e.g., Pierson 1993; Thelen 1999; Pierson & Skocpol 2002;
Campbell 2003; Ellis & Faricy 2011). Moreover, we expect the nature of spending policies
to affect how likely it is that the fit between spending and economic need matters for
public opinion formation toward the EU.As redistributive spending is relatively salient and
characterised by high conflict when compared to distributive spending, we expect it to be
more likely that individuals’ support for the EU will depend on the fit between European
spending and economic need in redistributive spending areas. We develop this argument
on the basis of a broader literature on public policy spending (e.g., Lowi 1964;Wilson 1973;
Ripley & Franklin 1991; Smith & Larimer 2009; Cairney 2011).
Second, we compare the effects on support for the EU of European spending targeting
multiple policy areas in EU regions, such as employment, social inclusion, transport,
infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environment. For this purpose, we compile a unique
dataset encompassing 127 EU regions in 13 member states during the period 2001–2011,
which includes, for the first time, actual payment data and not, as commonly used in the
literature, funding committed to regions at the beginning of a financial period (cf. Dellmuth
2011).The evidence strongly endorses our argument.We find that support is a function of the
fit between regional economic need and policy areas targeted byEU spending in three of five
areas: human capital, infrastructure and environment. Moreover, we find these moderating
effects of economic need in those spending areas that are redistributive and not distributive
in character.More generally, we demonstrate that economic theories of support for the EU
need to be substantially refined to identify the impact of distributional consequences or
economic benefits on attitudes toward the EU.
EU spending, policy feedback and public support for the EU
There is no paucity of literature on the determinants of citizen support for theEU.Economic
theories explain support as a function of an individual’s rational evaluation of the economic
costs and benefits of the EU. Support is related to how the EU impacts an individual’s
pocketbook, either in terms of personal wellbeing or the relative economic performance of
their region or country (e.g., Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Anderson & Reichert 1995; Gabel
1998; Christin 2005). Identity theories, by contrast, show how individuals with trenchant
exclusive, national identities tend to be less supportive of the EU than those with inclusive,
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communal and European identities (e.g., McLaren 2002; De Vreese & Boomgarden 2005;
Hooghe & Marks 2005; Chalmers & Dellmuth 2015). For other scholars, the ideological
positions taken up and disseminated by key domestic political actors can shape or ‘cue’
an individual’s support for the EU.1 Cognitive heuristics when evaluating supranational
institutions have also been shown to matter. Several studies argue that citizens who know
relatively little or nothing tend to form opinions about the EU based on their general
experiences of domestic political institutions (e.g., Rohrschneider 2002; Muñoz et al. 2011;
Harteveld et al. 2013; Armingeon & Ceka 2014). Finally, scholars have also pointed out
that support is conditional on an individual’s awareness of political processes and policies
(e.g., Inglehart 1970; Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Karp et al. 2003). Factors like education
and political awareness are closely intertwined in increasing knowledge about political
institutions beyond the nation-state (Norris & Inglehart 2009), potentially inducing a global
‘skill revolution’ (Rosenau 2003) and leading to learning that is supportive of dominant
values toward European political institutions (e.g., Inglehart 1970; Caldeira & Gibson 1995;
Harteveld et al. 2013).
Despite providing a compelling picture explaining support for the EU, existing studies
still tend to give short shrift to important variation in the EU’s spending policies. While
a central finding in existing studies is that greater fiscal transfers correlate with greater
levels of public support (Anderson & Reichert 1995; Gabel & Palmer 1995; Karp et al.
2003; Hooghe & Marks 2005; Harteveld et al. 2013), these studies do not theorise this link,
failing to make a distinction between the various types of funding that constitute these net
transfers. Instead, previous work lumps together any number of spending strategies and
policies carried out by the EU. This is a particularly grave oversight for funds transferred
via the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), which consist of multiple
financial instruments with fiscal transfers targeting specific policy areas. Furthermore, the
positive relationship between net benefits and support for the EUmight also – and perhaps
primarily – reflect the actual influence of a third unobserved variable:EU public investment
in European subnational regions,2 which is highly correlated with net benefits of countries
from the EU budget (Chalmers & Dellmuth 2015). Exposed to the economic circumstances
in their immediate regional social and economic environment, citizens might reward the
EU with greater support for the receipt of European public investment in their region.
Moreover, we know from the literature on policy feedback mechanisms that citizens might
not care equally about all existing forms of public spending (e.g., Campbell 2003; Ellis &
Faricy 2011; Mettler 2011). Hence, as previous research treats European spending policies
as a single,monolithic entity, it remains unclear how far the EU’s ability to enhance citizens’
support for the EU varies across policy areas.
Our argument in this article is that understanding the impact of the EU’s spending policy
on support requires amore nuanced approach to the degree towhich spending is appropriate
given regional economic need.We assume that individuals care about whether public capital
is spent appropriately given social and economic need in that individual’s region.The extent
to which the money that is transferred accommodates the needs of a region will influence
whether the amount of money transferred influences the support for the EU of people
living in that region. This insight marks a considerable advance on existing EU studies. In
developing a theoretical framework, we find guidance in the well-established literature on
policy feedback mechanisms.
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Effects of EU spending and economic need on support for the EU
Building on the seminal work of Schattschneider (1935) and Lowi (1964), recent scholarship
demonstrates when and howpolicies influence individuals’ behaviours and attitudes (Wilson
1973; Pierson 1993; Thelen 1999; Pierson & Skocpol 2002). A central insight in this
literature is that policy has a causal effect. For Pierson (1993), policies affect behaviours
and attitudes insofar as they can generate recipient constituencies with incentives to protect
constituencies’ benefits accrued from policies. More recent scholarship takes this a step
further, examining how policies convey information to beneficiaries and how this, in turn,
affects recipients’ attitudes and behaviours. To a large extent, the successful transmission of
this information is dependent on the nature and content of the policy itself – for example,
the size of the policy benefits or their duration (Campbell 2003). For the most part, scholars
have approached policy characteristics in terms of policy traceability.Neoliberal and rational
choice theories have long held that constituents tend to reward legislators primarily for
delivering on easy-to-observe benefits, such as new spending programmes, especially those
related to private rather than common or shared goods (Soss 1999, 2000; Campbell 2003;
Morgan & Campbell 2011). Even efficient and popular policies do not benefit from the
same boost if they remain abstract, inconspicuous or have long-term common good benefits.
An equally large literature on pork-barrel politics provides further support for the basic
idea that discernible benefits matter for the ability of politicians to increase public support
through the spending of public capital, both in the context of domestic (e.g.,Golden & Picci
2008) and EU spending (e.g., Dellmuth & Stoffel 2012).
Policy feedback scholars provide specific evidence about the effects of policy traceability
on public attitudes and behaviours. For instance, Arnold (1990) explains how policies that
can be discernably traced back to specific government action tend to have greater feedback
effects than policies that have no clear link to government actions. Similarly, several scholars
of American politics have examined important differences in ‘high visibility’ direct spending
programmes versus ‘low visibility’ tax breaks. Ellis and Faricy (2011) show how direct
spending programmes in the United States tend to garner more public support than indirect
programmes (like tax expenditures) simply because they are more visible to the public.
Similarly,Mettler (2011) explains how social policy benefits delivered through theAmerican
tax code as tax breaks tend to not be recognised by recipients as government benefits, but
are instead part of an ever expanding ‘submerged state’ infrastructure. Importantly, these
submerged policies do not generate the same kind of attention to government action as do
traceable direct spending programmes.
Recent research into policy feedbackmechanisms,however, acknowledges that feedback
effects are not simply a matter of policy discernibility and traceability. Instead, the economic
circumstances of beneficiaries also matter. For example, Soss and Schram (2007) assess
policy feedback in terms of how individuals evaluate specific spending programmes. Some
programmes are ‘distant’ insofar as individuals tend to think they will never draw on these
benefits. Other programmes are ‘proximate’, allowing individuals to identify as potential
(future) beneficiaries.Hence,attitudes about policies depend on the fit between the spending
policy and an individual’s specific economic circumstances. Any informational effects of
specific policies are therefore conditional on the economic circumstances of the recipient
of this information.
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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The central insight to be garnered from existing studies is that spending matters for
individual opinion formation, but only insofar as spending policies are adequate given the
specific economic circumstances of an individual. Any supportive attitudes towards the EU
that are linked to spending policies are affected by the fit between how funds are spent and a
region’s immediate economic needs. The greater the fit between the two, the more transfers
will be visible to the individuals receiving them and the more likely they will be traced back
to the EU. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Individuals support the EU more the more regions in which they live receive
ESIF in ways that address regional need.
Assumptions about the fit between spending and regional economic need rest on a
central causal mechanism: an individual’s knowledge of policy characteristics. Just like
voting behaviour (Campbell 2012: 337), attitudes of support might be conditionally linked
to spending polices through other, more stable factors like knowledge of the policies. At
one level, citizens’ only need to possess rudimentary knowledge to trace spending back to
the EU. If they are not knowledgeable, they might rely on other heuristics to form their
opinions. For instance, individuals only need to link broader macroeconomic local trends
to EU integration. This level of awareness is consistent with assumptions in previous EU
literature about how support for the EU co-varies with perceived changes to an individual’s
economic circumstances (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998;
Karp et al. 2003) and European spending in individuals’ regions (Chalmers & Dellmuth
2015) and countries (Anderson & Reichert 1995; Hooghe & Marks 2005; Harteveld et al.
2013).
At another level, however, awareness is more precise, implying some specific knowledge
of EU spending policies. While this sets the bar high for individual knowledge (see also
Eichenberg & Dalton 1993: 512), recent Flash Eurobarometer (FEB) polls from 2008, 2010,
2013 and 2015 paint a rather optimistic picture.3 These polls show that, on balance, citizens
are aware of ‘EU regional policy’ and ‘EU co-financed projects’, with more than one-third
of respondents indicating knowledge of these policies in a given year. These same polls also
show a consistent link between awareness of these spending measures and receipt of more
funding. For instance, awareness tends to be much higher for individuals living in regions
‘that have been eligible for funds in previous years’ (FEB 2008: 5) and that are ‘eligible for
support under the Convergence objective” (FEB 2010: 8; FEB 2013: 7; FEB 2015) which,
compared to other funding objectives, constitutes the vast bulk of EU funding.
Awareness can be impacted by the nature of spending policies. Lowi’s (2012) classic
distinction between distributive and redistributive policies provides some insight, especially
as it applies to the ESIF (see also Wilson 1973; Ripley & Franklin 1991; Smith & Larimer
2009; Cairney 2011; for use in the case of the EU, see Bache 2007).4 Distributive policies
typically involve spending on public goods, like national defence contracts, public land
management and transportation. The costs of distributive spending are diffuse with no clear
winners or losers. By targeting public goods, which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable,
such spending tends to have low levels of salience among the public and invokes low levels
of conflict among competing groups. Redistributive policies, by contrast, involve spending
on so-called ‘private goods’, like in the case of progressive income tax or non-contributive
welfare programmes. Spending on private goods is ‘rivalrous’ and ‘excludable’, drawing out a
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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clear distinction between the ‘“haves” and the “have nots”’ (Lowi 1964: 328).Redistributive
policies therefore tend to be highly salient invoking high levels of conflict among competing
groups. In sum, the nature of spending policies should have a conditional effect on the
relationship stated in our first hypothesis. This leads to a second hypothesis:
H2: The relationship posited inH1 ismore likely in the case of redistributive spending
than in the case of distributive spending.
Data and methodology
To examine the relative explanatory power of our hypothesis, we compile a dataset from a
variety of sources. Since the hypotheses predict individual-level effects on public support
for the EU as factors at the regional level, our unit of analysis is a person in a specific
region (in a specific country). At the individual level, we use Eurobarometer (EB) data to
create an indicator for support for the EU.At the regional level, we measure EU funding in
different spending categories by drawing on data provided by the European Commission’s
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG Regio).5 Other regional-level as
well as country-level factors are derived from Eurostat (2016). Our analysis is restricted to
the EB surveys conducted during the years for which indicators for all theoretical concepts
are available.We use all EBdata available for the purpose of our analysis,which yields yearly
data from 2001 to 2011.The samples are representative at the level of those regions for which
we have compiled the spending data.6 We limit our analysis to 127 regions in the following
13 EU member states for which data for this time period are available: Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. In what follows, we detail the measurement of the variables that are
included in the empirical analysis.7
Support for the EU, our dependent variable, is measured using the responses to the
following EB question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership
of the European Union is: (–1) a bad thing, (0) neither good nor bad, or (1) a good thing?’
In contrast to some alternative measures for public support for the EU, this measure is
consistently asked yearly in the EB (cf.Hooghe &Marks 2005). The validity of this measure
has been widely debated in the literature, providing evidence that respondents who support
EU membership generally also support more specific integrative measures (e.g., Gabel
1998). The variable thus captures citizens’ short-term satisfaction with specific EU outputs
as well as long-term attachment to the EU that is not contingent upon the satisfaction
with specific outputs, over time (Online Appendix Figure B1). It is currently the accepted
measure for support for the process of supranational integration (Gabel & Scheve 2007).
To test our hypotheses, we have gathered European spending data through the ESIF
at the regional level in €1,000 per capita for two financial perspectives: 2000–2006 and
2007–2013.8 These data are disaggregated across a broad range of spending items. To
examine differences related to the nature of spending policies (H2), we coded spending into
redistributive spending categories and distributive spending categories (Online Appendix
Table A4).
Redistributive spending includes: (1) human capital, physical capital and innovation;
(2) transport and infrastructure; and (3) environment. In line with Lowi’s (1964) typology,
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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we code spending items in the redistributive spending category that we expect to be
relatively salient and characterised by high conflict. Such spending typically targets specific
societal groups, economic sectors or businesses.Winners and losers are easily identifiable as
benefits are concentrated. In the human capital category, spending goes to specific sectors
or businesses, implying high conflict about which sector or firm receives most. In transport,
most spending targets specific local road or railway projects or specific sparsely populated
regions that receive support for infrastructure such as broadband and telephone networks,
introducing conflict among municipalities and regions. In the area of environment, funding
targets typically relatively large nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and environmental
administrations that have extensive networks and experience, at the expense of smaller and
less resourceful NGOs (see the lists of fundedNGOs,2001–2011, inDGEnvironment 2016).
Distributive spending includes: (4) energy; and (5) egriculture, forest, tourism and
fishery.9 Energy investment flows mainly to local and regional authorities that want to
promote energy investment projects or programmes on electricity, gas, noise prevention
and drinking water. Agricultural spending under the ESIF – in contrast to agricultural
spending under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – targets public goods such as
agricultural water management, land improvement, re-parcelling, planting of non-farm land,
improving harvesting of forestry products, protection of the coast and encouragement of
tourist activities. In both categories, it is hard to find losers as benefits are diffuse, which is
why we code spending items in these categories as distributive.
The data on ESIF allocations cannot be broken down by year. Moreover, data on
actual allocations for different spending categories for each year cannot be coded ‘bottom-
up’ using investment project data for the different regions. Instead, DG Regio provides
data on the amounts spent in different policy areas only for aggregate funding periods.
We merge these spending data aggregated within the two funding periods to the yearly EB
data, implying that the spending variables are time-invariant within funding periods. While
yearly spending data across spending categories would have been ideal, the data at hand
are suitable for our purposes for two main reasons. First, we find the yearly variation in
spending levels within funding periods to be very low when depicting the yearly variation in
spending levels obtained from DG Regio, that are, as mentioned above, not disaggregated
by spending categories (Online Appendix Figure B1). Spending levels over time are
relatively even within funding periods,with only Greece and Portugal showing slightly more
variegated patterns during the period 2000–2006. Consequently, we do not expect large
fluctuations in yearly spending in different spending categories either that might predict EU
support. Second, that spending is decided at the beginning of a funding period and barely
fluctuates yearly, strengthens our research design. Given very limited yearly variation in
regional spending, the assumption is warranted that politicians and EU officials do not try
to spend EU funds strategically across regions to boost people’s support for the EU within
budgetary periods, but rather at the outset of a budgetary period (see also Dellmuth 2011).
This reduces the risk of potential endogeneity problems in our analysis.
Next, we gather data on ‘regional economic need’ using specific regional-level economic
indicators from Eurostat (2016).We assume that the regional level is a good approximation
of what people perceive to be their immediate social and economic context. Furthermore, as
ESIF are allocated at the regional level, we deem this to be the appropriate unit of analysis
in the context of this study. All of our remaining indicators are measured yearly and at the
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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level of the regions that received transfers through theESIF.For eachEU spending category,
we derive an annual regional economic need indicator from Eurostat (2016) that taps a
central aspect of a region’s specific economic needs. While there are not many measures at
the regional level available for the entire time period and all countries that are being studied
here, we were able to select a range of appropriate regional economic need indicators from
Eurostat in terms of their logical fit with our spending policy data (see Online Appendix
Table A4 for more details).
Wemeasure regional economic need relevant for human capital investment by relying on
an indicator that captures a central aspect of the labour market targeted by EU investment.
This indicator measures High-skilled employment – that is, the share of the population that
has tertiary education and/or is employed in science and technology. The higher the share,
the less urgent people may perceive the need for investment in the high-skilled labour
force. Second, we measure regional economic need relevant for infrastructure investment
using two indicators that each taps a different aspect of EU infrastructure investment –
namely, EU investment in infrastructure especially in rural and urban areas. Motorways
measures all navigable road networks in kilometers per 1,000 km2,and indicates the need for
infrastructure investment in rural areas. Less extensive road networks indicate more need
for EU investment in infrastructure and transport. Third, we measure regional economic
need relevant for agricultural spending usingUtilised agricultural areameasured in thousand
hectares. This measure indicates the extension and importance of rural areas in a region.
Fourth, our proxy for regional economic need relevant for energy spending is Population
density. Since energy investment flows mainly into electricity, gas, noise prevention and
drinking water (see Online Appendix Table A4), more densely populated areas may be
perceived as being in greater need for energy-related spending. Given the right-skewed
distribution with a few regions with extremely dense populations, we log this variable. Last,
to capture regional economic need relevant for investment in the environment, we use a
measure for the degree of a region’s urbanisation as most environmental investment by the
EU flows into densely populated areas to maintain high levels of sanitation, clean air and
water to safeguard health, and to curb pollution.A region’s geographical size is a good proxy
for Rurality as relatively large areas tend to be less urbanised (cf. Dellmuth & Stoffel 2012).
We assume that people perceive regions with relatively large rural areas to be in less need
of environmental investment, which should make them more negatively predisposed to EU
environmental subsidies.
Next, we operationalise several alternative explanations at the individual level that
are commonly tested in the EU literature. First, economic theories are tested using an
interaction term between respondents’ skill levels and gross domestic product (GDP). We
use a dichotomous variable coded ‘1’ if a respondent is aManual worker and ‘0’ if otherwise,
and the variable is coded so as to distinguish between unskilled workers, on the one hand,
and skilled manual workers and the remaining occupational categories, on the other (cf.
Hooghe & Marks 2005). Furthermore, we use GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS)
per inhabitant for the respondents’ region.This measure captures GDP at the regional level,
which is theoretically relevant as economic theories predict an effect of the distribution
of economic resources on an individual’s support for the EU, depending on the economic
context in which the individual lives. Given the large economic disparities among regions
within countries (Boldrin & Canova 2001), it is warranted to use a regional measure.
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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Second, we examine the degree to which people have a European identity by combining
two measures. Until 2009, we use a measure for geographical identity tapping people’s
attachment to a geographical jurisdiction that has been frequently used to measure
identification with supranational communities or groups of people (e.g., Hooghe & Marks
2005;Dellmuth&Tallberg 2015).From 2010,we coded the identitymeasure using responses
to a question about the extent to which people feel that they are EU citizens. The resulting
variable Identity ranges from ‘0’ (‘No, definitely not’) to ‘3’ (‘Yes, definitely’). This variable
captures communal identity as an identity that is not a function of a common history or
territory, but shaped or generated by a common liberal democratic constitution, such as
the European treaties (e.g., Bruter 2004; Chalmers & Dellmuth 2015). Ideally, we would
have used the same indicator for identity over time. However, since it is not consistently
included in the EB, it is not included in the main regression tables but in the robustness
checks reported below.
Third, to assess the logic of extrapolation argument, we use data on individual Trust in
government: whether a respondent tends to (‘1’) or tends not to (‘0’) trust his or her national
government.
Fourth, theories of political awareness are accounted for using an indicator for political
Knowledge about the institution that is responsible for the implementation of EU spending:
the European Commission. The measure is coded ‘1’ if the respondent has heard of the
Commission and ‘0’ if otherwise.
Fifth, we control for Age (a continuous variable), Gender (a dichotomous variable
that equals ‘1’ for females and ‘0’ for males) and Education. Education as a nine-point
indicator measuring at what age a respondent has finished formal education. It is coded
‘1’ if the respondent was 14 years or younger and ‘9’ if he or she was 22 years or
older.
Finally, there might be temporal effects. To begin with, recent literature argues that
the experience of the financial crisis has affected people’s beliefs that the EU exerts its
authority appropriately to address financial and economic problems (Serricchio et al. 2013).
Our analysis includes time periods during which European economies were deeply affected
by the global financial crisis. During this period and even in the aftermath, people might
judge the EU differently.We capture potential unobserved temporal effects using a dummy
variable that is ‘1’ for the years 2007–2009 (the period during which the crisis was most
acute10) and ‘0’ otherwise. We explore potential effects of time trends in the data on our
results further in the robustness checks.
We checked whether some of the variables might be highly correlated. This was only
the case with the spending variables, which is why we do not enter them together in a
concomitant model.11
Empirical analysis
To test the relative explanatory power of our hypothesis, we estimate a series of multilevel
regression analyses.12 As Support takes on three ordered values, we estimate the models
using ordered logistic regression. We add random intercepts at the regional and country
levels as we expect responses to vary across regional and national contexts and since they
capture the combined potentially unobserved regional and national context effects on
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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Table 1. Random intercept mixed-effects three-level models of support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EU investment
Human capital 1.16*** (0.02)
Infrastructure 1.57*** (0.03)
Agriculture 1.62*** (0.36)
Energy 1.90*** (0.09)
Environment 0.90 (0.43)
Alternative explanations
Manual worker 0.83*** (0.05) 0.81*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05) 0.83** (0.05) 0.82*** (0.05)
GDP 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00)
Manual worker*GDP 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)
Trust in government 2.60*** (0.03) 2.59*** (0.03) 2.60*** (0.03) 2.60*** (0.03) 2.59*** (0.03)
Knowledge 1.34*** (0.02) 1.34*** (0.02) 1.34*** (0.02) 1.33*** (0.02) 1.33*** (0.02)
Education 1.10*** (0.00) 1.10*** (0.00) 1.10*** (0.00) 1.10*** (0.00) 1.10*** (0.00)
Age 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00)
Gender 0.83*** (0.01) 0.83*** (0.01) 0.83*** (0.01) 0.83*** (0.01) 0.83*** (0.01)
Financial crisis 1.02 (0.01) 1.02 (0.01) 1.02 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01)
N 106,823 106,823 106,823 106,823 106,823
BIC 196815.27 196941.71 196818.25 196815.67 196804.93
Notes: Odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p
< 0.001.
Support. Our level 1 data are at the individual level, clustered in 127 regions (level 2) and
13 countries (level 3).13
Our hypotheses build on several observable implications about the ways in which the fit
between policy characteristics and regional economic need has an effect on public support
for the EU. These observable implications are operationalised through interaction terms
between spending variables and regional economic conditions that spending is supposed to
improve. We present our main results in Tables 1 and 2. Specifically, we present results of
the effects of ESIF spending on Support across the different spending categories in Table 1.
Table 2 testsH1 andH2 by including a series of interaction terms reflecting the ‘fit’ between
policy areas and regional economic need.
Table 1 illustrates that four of the five spending areas have a statistically significant
positive correlation with Support, whereas the coefficient of environment spending is not
statistically significant.More specifically, the evidence suggests that people’s support for the
EU is greater the more funding their regions receive in the areas of human capital, physical
capital, innovation, transport infrastructure, agriculture and energy. That not all forms of
spending seem to shape support underpins the need for disaggregated analyses of spending
effects, building on a broader literature showing that people do not care equally about all
forms of spending (Campbell 2012).
Results in Table 2, by including a series of interaction terms to capture the conditional
effect of ESIF on support, lend support to H1 in human capital, infrastructure and
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Table 2. Random intercept mixed-effects three-level models of support: Interaction terms
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Interaction terms
Human capital*High-skilled 0.98*** (0.00)
Infrastructure*Motorways 0.99*** (0.00)
Agriculture*Utilised area 1.00 (0.00)
Energy*Population density (log) 1.23** (0.01)
Environment*Rurality 1.00*** (0.00)
EU investment
Human capital 1.11*** (0.03)
Infrastructure 1.11*** (0.06)
Agriculture 0.87 (0.30)
Energy 1.39* (0.20)
Environment 35.35** (47.05)
High-skilled employment 0.98*** (0.00)
Motorways 1.00 (0.00)
Utilised agricultural area 1.00* (0.00)
Population density (log) 1.10*** (0.02)
Rurality 1.00*** (0.00)
Alternative explanations
Manual worker 0.82*** (0.05) 0.85* (0.05) 0.83** (0.05) 0.84** (0.05) 0.85** (0.05)
GDP 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00* (0.00)
Manual worker*GDP 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)
Trust in government 2.58*** (0.03) 2.49*** (0.04) 2.55*** (0.04) 2.60*** (0.04) 2.62*** (0.04)
Knowledge 1.34*** (0.02) 1.34*** (0.03) 1.35*** (0.03) 1.33*** (0.02) 1.32*** (0.02)
Education 1.10*** (0.00) 1.11*** (0.00) 1.09*** (0.00) 1.10*** (0.00) 1.10*** (0.00)
Age 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00)
Gender 0.83*** (0.01) 0.84*** (0.01) 0.85*** (0.01) 0.84*** (0.01) 0.84*** (0.01)
Financial crisis 1.04** (0.01) 1.02 (0.02) 1.03 (0.02) 1.02 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01)
N 106,050 88,859 78,905 103,589 103,589
BIC 195084.77 163239.01 145939.08 190675.89 190675.90
Notes: Odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
environment spending, as well as ample support to H2. The interaction terms capture the
fit between spending policy characteristics, regional economic need and Support. To present
our main findings, we plot all interaction terms from Table 2 as the coefficient of a product
term included in non-linear models does not allow for inferences about the significance of
the marginal effect of one variable on another at the levels of a third variable (cf. Ai &
Norton 2003). Hence, we report the interaction terms using marginal effects plots (cf. Berry
et al. 2012).14
To begin with,Figure 1 depicts themarginal effect ofHuman capital spending on Support
at different levels of the shares of high skilled employment (model 6). The solid line shows
the estimated marginal effect on the probability that respondents pass a specific threshold s
on the variable Support. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of the 95 per cent confidence
interval for this estimate. Higher shares of high-skilled employment indicate less need for
human capital investment in high skilled labour, boosting innovation and research. Among
regions in which this need is relatively high (i.e., at low shares of highly skilled people in
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Figure 1. Effect of Human capital spending on support at levels of High-skilled employment. Notes:
Estimation based on model 6 in Table 2. Solid line depicts the marginal effect on support. Dashed lines
depict the 95 per cent confidence intervals of the marginal effect.
labour), the effect of human capital spending on support increases inmagnitude.By contrast,
when need is relatively low, the effect of human capital spending on support decreases in size
but remains positive in regions with an employment share of people with tertiary education
of about 35 per cent or higher. The results from Figure 1 refine the finding in Table 1,
suggesting that the positive effect ofHuman capital investment on support is stronger when
need for human capital investment is relatively high, and weaker when need for human
capital investment is relatively low or absent.
We see further evidence for our hypothesis when we look at fiscal transfers to
infrastructure in transport (model 7). Figure 2 shows that the effect of fiscal transfers to
infrastructure and transport on support for the EU is positive in regions with relatively few
motorways – that is, more rural regions with relatively poor infrastructure. In regions with a
relatively tight net of motorways, the link between investment in infrastructure and support
is weakened and becomes eventually negative. Again, these findings refine the result about
the effect of infrastructure spending on support, demonstrating that increases in Support
depend on ESIF spending toward a region’s infrastructure in a targeted manner.
We do not find that the effect of EU agriculture spending on support shown in Table 1
is moderated by regional economic need (see Online Appendix Figure B3). Both regions
with a very small utilised agriculture area like Antwerp, Berlin or London, and regions
with a relatively large agricultural sector, such as in Extremadura, Champagne-Ardenne
or Saarland, receive agriculture subsidies through the ESIF. That the effect of agriculture
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Figure 2. Effect of Infrastructure spending on support at levels of Motorways. Notes: Estimation based on
model 7 in Table 2. Solid line depicts the marginal effect on support. Dashed lines depict the 95 per cent
confidence intervals of the marginal effect.
spending on support does not depend on the degree of utilised agriculture area may be due
to the fact that the EU invests relatively little money in agriculture in the form of regional
development funds outside the CAP (see Online Appendix Figure B2). Finally, with respect
to energy spending, the results from model 9 suggest that the effect of energy spending
on support revealed in Table 1 is not moderated by economic need (see Online Appendix
Figure B4).
Discussing EU investment in the environment, we plot the interaction term from model
10 in Figure 3. As expected in H1 and H2, environmental spending has a positive effect on
public support for the EU in relatively urbanised regions such as Berlin, London,Vienna or
Brussels.However, the effect turns negative in regions that are in less need of environmental
spending, indicating that environmental subsidies decrease support in relatively rural areas –
that is, in areas that are less in need for EU environment subsidies targeting mostly water
safety, clean air and pollution.
In sum, the evidence supports H1 in the areas of human capital, infrastructure and
environmental spending, suggesting that in these areas EU spending increases public
support for the EU if it targets regional need.Moreover, there is strong evidence supporting
H2 as we find these moderating effects of regional need in the context of redistributive
policy areas (human capital, transport and infrastructure) and not in distributive policy areas
(energy and agriculture).
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Figure 3. Effect ofEnvironment spending on support at levels ofRurality.Notes:Estimation based onmodel
10 in Table 2.Solid line depicts themarginal effect on support.Dashed lines depict the 95 per cent confidence
intervals of the marginal effect.
With regard to the alternative explanations, our results tie in well with previous research
that shows that support for the EU is greater among the better educated (e.g., Chalmers &
Dellmuth 2015), more knowledgeable (e.g., Harteveld et al. 2013) and trusting in domestic
political institutions (e.g., Armingeon & Cheka 2014). Furthermore, support is greater
among younger people, which may be explained by the fact that younger people are more
cosmopolitan and are therefore more likely to perceive regional integration as a good thing
(e.g., Inglehart & Rabier 1978). Finally, we do not find evidence for an effect of the crisis
dummy, which suggests that temporal context factors do not affect support for the EU, all
else being equal.
Robustness checks
We provide five robustness checks that assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative
model specifications. We start with the results in the category of environment spending.
Since the degree of Rurality is moderately highly correlated with Population density (log)
(r = −0.57; N = 230,285), we run a robustness check with a cruder proxy for rurality:
Waste production in regions, which is moderately highly correlated with Rurality (r = 0.37;
N = 71,433), as larger more rural areas produce more waste, but largely uncorrelated with
Population density (log) (r= 0.15;N= 71,433).This lattermeasure,however, is only available
for 78 out of 127 regions, and for ten of our 13 countries (Finland, Greece and Sweden
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are excluded). This change in model specification does not affect the interpretation of
our results, as they suggest that the positive effect of EU environment spending on public
support is strengthened in areas with more waste production (Online Appendix Table B1
and Figure B5).
Second, as mentioned above, we replicate our analyses by including Identity, which
reduces the sample to the years 2003–2006 and 2010 given that questions tapping social
identity were not included in all EB surveys. Our results remain robust to this change
in model specification (Online Appendix Tables B2 and B3). Moreover, we check for a
moderating effect of Identity on the interaction terms that we test in Table 2. For this
purpose,we simulate the marginal effects of spending on support at levels of economic need
among those with an exclusive national identity and those with a relatively strong European
identity.15 The results suggest that the interaction effects do not substantially differ across
levels of identity (Online Appendix Figures B6–B8). Yet Figure 2 changes slightly in the
reduced sample. The marginal effect of infrastructure spending turns negative in regions
that are less in need of infrastructure investment, suggesting that spending in the smaller
sample has negative effects on EU support among individuals living in such regions. This
does not, however, change the main interpretation of our results in light of H1 and H2.
Third, there might be a trend in the degree to which funding shapes support: the more
the funding period progresses, the more time the money might have had to have an impact
in regions, making it more likely that people develop more favourable opinions toward the
EU.We capture this potential effect by adding a variableCount for the years after a funding
period started, ranging from 0 to 6. For example, the count variable is 0 in 2000 and 2007, 1
in 2001 and 2008, 2 in 2002 and 2009 and so on. Our results remain robust to including this
variable (Online Appendix Tables B4 and B5), and we do not find evidence that the effects
in Tables 1 and 2 on support for the EU depend on such a time trend (Online Appendix
Table B6 and Figure B9).
Fourth, we introduce three country-specific indicators into our analyses that might
explain variation in support:National unemployment,National fiscal transfers and National
GDP (see, e.g.,Eichenberg &Dalton 1993;Hooghe&Marks 2005).We do not include these
indicators in the main regression tables due to relatively high correlations between some
of the country-level and spending indicators (Online Appendix Table A3). On balance,
replicating Tables 1 and 2 by including these country-level indictors (Online Appendix
Tables B7–B12) gives further support for the robustness of our results with regard to
Human capital, Infrastructure and Agriculture. By contrast, the coefficients of Energy and
Environment are sensitive to the inclusion of country-level indicators. In the models that
include National fiscal transfers and National GDP in Table 1, respectively, we see that
the effect of Environment spending on support turns statistically significant and positive
(Online Appendix Tables B8 and B9). Furthermore, the coefficient of the interaction term
between Energy and Population density in the replications of Table 2 (Online Appendix
Tables B10–B12) becomes statistically significant. However, given that these models suffer
from multicollinearity, we choose not to interpret these results as further evidence for H1.
Finally, our hypotheses are based on the assumption that people are able to trace
spending back to the EU and link this, at least partial, knowledge to their perceptions of
regional need.We explore this assumption by simulating the marginal effects for those who
have at least partial knowledge and for those who do not. In our data, the most appropriate
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measure indicates if a person has heard of the Commission or not, as the Commission is
responsible for the implementation of the EU budget and present in regional committees
as an adviser in the course of a funding period (cf. Bachtler &Mendez 2007). If people have
heard of and therefore have at least partial knowledge about the Commission, then they
should be more able to rationally evaluate public spending and trace received funds back to
theEU.Using the indicatorKnowledge, the data show thatmost people have at least heard of
the Commission (85 per cent).For the robustness check,we show how the interaction effects
from Table 2 change among those who have not heard of the Commission (Knowledge =
0) and those who have (Knowledge = 1).16 We find some evidence that marginal effects
of spending on support at levels of economic need are larger among those who hold some
knowledge of the Commission (see Online Appendix Figures B10–B12), but not convincing
enough to conclude that there might indeed be a moderating effect of political knowledge.
Given the lack of data, we leave it to future research to test in depth whether needs-based
spending is most effective in raising EU support among those who hold relevant knowledge,
and less effective among those who do not.
Conclusion
The central argument presented in this article is that we can only understand the effects
of spending on support for the EU when examining how transfers are spent. Drawing on
insights from the policy feedback literature, we developed two hypotheses that explain
support as a function of the fit between the policy area targeted by transfers and the regional
economic needs in which individuals live.Our results provide further support for the notion
that fiscal transfers do not influence levels of individual support for the EU except for
investment in energy. Instead, the fit between targeted transfers and economic need is an
important determinant of support. Needs-based transfers lead to more support in the area
of EU investment in human capital, infrastructure and environmentally relevant projects –
spending areas with the hallmarks of redistributive spending that is highly salient, conflictive,
and creates clear winners and losers.
Taken together, our findings call for a refinement of economic theories of support for the
EU. The nuanced approach taken here, whereby support is examined as a function of the
fit between how transfers are spent and the regional economic circumstances of individuals,
marks a first step in this direction.
While findings are specific to the context of EU, future research could well examine the
extent to which they are transferable to other regional integration projects and international
organisations around the globe. The EU is not unique in the difficulties it faces in shoring
up democratic legitimacy in its institutions through policy making (e.g., Zaum 2013). In
regional and international organisations other than the EU, organisational legitimation
strategies that seek to enhance public support through policy are typically not linked to
spending, but to other forms of policy output such as soft law or providing stakeholders with
access. Legitimation strategies can be conceived of as deliberative goal-oriented activities
by which organisations create and maintain support for themselves. Our article shows
how organisations can enhance their own legitimacy through a specific strategy – namely,
spending in different issue areas, depending on the fit between spending and regional
economic need. As research has shown, public support for regional and international
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institutions is a widespread issue relevant for the United Nations (Dellmuth & Tallberg
2015), the Bretton Woods institutions (Johnson 2011), as well as other regional institutions
(Schlipphak 2014) like the Association of South East Asian Nations or the African Union.
The Common Market of the South (Mercosur) has established a Fund for the Structural
Convergence of Mercosur in 2006, which is similar to the ESIF in terms of allocation
process and funding objectives (cf. Medeiros 2007). Our findings on the effects of spending
policies on public support for the EU may serve as a catalyst advancing the comparative
research agenda on the sources of public support for regional and international institutions.
As such institutions are increasingly becoming the object of contestation and politicisation
(Zürn et al. 2012), knowledge about the conditions under which regional and international
organisations can enhance their own legitimacy through spending becomes more relevant.
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Notes
1. Evidence supporting this argument is mixed.Whereas several studies find support for an effect of elite
communication on public support for the EU (DeVreese &Boomgaarden 2005;Gabel & Scheve 2007),
others find an effect that is conditional on other variables (Maier et al. 2012) or they find no effect
(Chalmers & Dellmuth 2015).
2. We refer to regions as administrative jurisdictions located between the local (municipality) and the
national level.
3. Although the Flash Eurobarometer data on citizen awareness of EU regional policy only started in
2008, these figures are alsonindicative of the level of awareness of citizens in the EU before this time
period.
4. Lowi’s (1964) typology includes redistributive and distributive policies as well as regulatory policies.
This final category is not included in this analysis as it is not relevant to spending through the ESIF.
5. The European Commission is hereinafter referred to as the ‘Commission’.
6. See, for more information: http://zacat.gesis.org. The dataset is based on the following EB surveys: 56.1
(2001); 60.1 (2003); 61.0 (2004); 62.0 (2004); 63.4 (2004); 64.2 (2005); 65.2 (2006); 66.1 (2006); 68.1 (2007);
69.2 (2008); 701. (2008); 71.1 (2009; 71.3 (2009); 72.4 (2009); 73.4 (2010); 74.2 (2010); 75.3 (2011).
7. For a detailed overview of data sources, measurement and descriptive statistics, see Online Appendix
Tables A1–A3.
8. These data refer to the amount of ESIF that have been allocated to regions during these two funding
periods provided by DG Regio C3.
9. SeeOnlineAppendix TableA4 for an overview of the budget components that constitute our categories.
See Online Appendix Figure B2 for a detailed breakdown of the different funding categories across the
13 member states in our dataset.
10. On this point, see the European Central Bank’s Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (http://sdw.
ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node = 9551138).
11. See correlation matrix in Online Appendix Table A3. Furthermore, the Variance Inflation Factor is
under 2 for all variable combinations, suggesting that multicollinearity does not inflate coefficient
estimates presented in Tables 1 and 2 (cf. Fox & Monette 1992).
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12. Analyses are conducted using post-stratification weights, as level 1 units are selected with unequal
probabilities. Level 2 weights are not available, but this is not a concern here since they were sampled
with equal probabilities.
13. The stylised regression model is written as follows:
logit{Pr(yijk > s|xijk, ζ1 j, ζ2k)} = βv(Xijk) + βw(Yjk) + βz(Zk) + ζ1 j + ζ2k + ε0jk + τ00k
where Pr(yij > s|xij, ζ1 j, ζ2k) is the cumulative probability that respondent i living in region j in country
k has a level of EU support that is higher than the threshold s; X are vectors for the individual-level
variables;Y are vectors for the regional-level variables;Z are vectors of country-level variables; ζ1 j is the
intercept of the cumulative logits that varies over region j; ζ2k is the intercept that varies over country k;
ε0jk is the error term that is separate for regions j; and τ00k is the error term that is separate for countries
k. The number of individuals included in the models can, however, vary depending on the included
independent variables.
14. We calculate the marginal effects for the interaction plots following Wooldridge (2001: 505, Eqn 15.88),
yielding P(y* = J|x) at different levels of the moderator variables, where y* is the latent variable and J
is a cut point in the ordered logit regression model. The plots are calculated with Stata by revising the
code suggested by Brambor et al. (2006).
15. We do not include a three-way product term for two reasons. First, we expect an inadvertent interaction
effect of Identity in the data due to ‘compression’ (cf. Berry et al. 2010).Hence, including a product term
in the regression models would reduce the likelihood that we will find a statistically significant effect of
Identity on the interaction between policy characteristics and policy area.Second, three-way interactions
exacerbate problems with multicollinearity and a loss in statistical power.
16. We test for a moderating effect of Knowledge on the interaction terms between spending and need on
support without including a three-way product term for the same reasons mentioned in Note 15 above.
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